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Graded Membership in the European Union:
Good Goveranance and Differentiated Integration
Frank Schimmelfennig
Abstract
The study of European integration has traditionally focused on organizational growth: the deepening and 
widening of the European Union (EU). By contrast, this article analyzes organizational differentiation, a 
process in which states refuse, or are being refused, full integration but find value in establishing in-be-
tween grades of membership. It describes how the EU’s system of graded membership has developed, 
and it explains the positioning of states in this system. The core countries of the EU set a standard of good 
governance. The closer European countries are to this standard, the closer their membership grade is to 
the core. Some countries fall short of this standard and are refused further integration by the core: their 
membership grade increases with better governance. Other countries refuse further integration because 
they outperform the standards of the core countries: their membership grade decreases as governance 
improves. These conjectures are corroborated in a panel analysis of European countries.
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1. Introduction1
In the course of its history, the European Union (EU)2 has acquired competences in almost all areas of 
public policy and has transferred powers of the member states to supranational institutions. In addition, its 
membership has expanded from six to 28 countries. These developments in European integration – often 
dubbed “deepening” and “widening” – have been theorized and analyzed extensively in the literature on 
European integration. In other words, research on the dynamics of European integration has overwhelm-
ingly dealt with the functional, authority, and territorial growth of the EU as an organization. The same is 
true for the comparative literature on international and regional organizations: the conceptualization and 
measurements of institutional design has focused on the level of authority and the policy scope of inter-
national organizations (Koremenos et al. 2001; Acharya/Johnston 2007; Hooghe/Marks 2015; Haftel 2013).
This paper takes a different perspective. First, it starts from the fact that the deepening and widening of 
the EU has been accompanied by a process of differentiation. As the competences and the membership of 
the EU have grown, European integration has become less uniform. Whereas initially the integrated pol-
icies applied to all member states and to member states only, the congruence of membership and policy 
integration has become increasingly blurred. Today member states do not participate in EU policies such as 
monetary union or the Schengen area of abolished internal border controls, and the EU routinely excludes 
new member states from immediate participation in these two areas of integration. On the other hand, 
nonmember states participate in the EU’s customs union (Turkey), internal market (Iceland and Norway), 
or Schengen area, and they conclude trade, partnership, or association agreements. Adequate accounts of 
the dynamics of European integration need to move beyond the exclusive focus on deepening and widen-
ing and include differentiation as a core feature of the European integration process. 
Second, the paper takes a regional rather than a strictly organizational perspective. In the course of time, 
the EU has cast a net of varied institutional relationships across the region of Europe. An increasing number 
of countries have concluded broad formal agreements with the EU, which define the range and intensity of 
their cooperation and integration. No European country is currently without such an agreement. 3 Taking 
the two perspectives together, this paper examines the EU as a differentially integrated regional system.
Whereas differentiated integration has been an important topic of policy debate in the EU for a long 
time, systematic theory-based analysis has been rare until recently (Holzinger/Schimmelfennig 2012). 
Metaphorical taxonomies abound. For instance, “multi-speed Europe,” “core Europe,” “variable geometry,” 
1 My work on this paper has benefited from a fellowship at the KFG “The Transformative Power of Europe” (FU 
Berlin), directed by Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse. For helpful comments, I also thank Michael Bechtel, Jørgen 
Bølstad, James Cross, Tina Freyburg, Thomas Winzen, Arndt Wonka, and audiences at the Universities of Bremen, 
Dublin (UCD), ETH Zurich, St. Gallen, Tübingen as well as the European Union Studies Association (EUSA), Political 
Economy of International Organizations (PEIO), and Swiss Political Science Association (SPSA) conventions. A 
shorter and revised version of the paper will be published in the European Journal of Political Research.
2 Throughout the paper, references to the EU include its predecessor organizations, the European Communities.
3 Kosovo, a new and not universally recognized country, is currently negotiating an association agreement. The 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Belarus has not been ratified because of the political situation in the 
country.
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and “Europe à la carte” have long entered scholarly and political discourse (Stubb 1996). In addition, the lit-
erature has emphasized the EU’s “fuzzy borders” (Christiansen et al. 2000) and its formation of “concentric 
circles” of external governance (Lavenex 2011). Recent descriptions of the EU as an “empire” are consistent 
with the idea of graded membership and fuzzy, flexible borders – common features of empires – but focus 
on authority relations (Beck/Grande 2007; Marks 2012; Zielonka 2006). Moreover, the concept of empire 
comes with problematic historical connotations. In line with Schmitter’s concept of “condominio” (1996: 
136), Leuffen et al. (2013) introduce the term “system of differentiated integration,” which describes both 
variable membership and variable centralization of integrated policies. 
Existing comparative analyses have focused on differentiation either among EU member states or candi-
dates for EU accession. They have put forward a great variety of explanations for the differentiated integra-
tion of these sub-groups, including wealth and growth (Mattli 1999), economic lead sectors (Ingebritsen 
2000), distributional conflict (Plümper/Schneider 2007; Schneider 2009), democracy (Schimmelfennig 
2003), national identity (Gstöhl 2002), and policy type (Kölliker 2001; 2006). More recently, Schimmelfennig 
and Winzen (2014) defined scope conditions for these factors: whereas wealth differentials drive differenti-
ated integration in the context of enlargement, national identities and the integration of core state powers 
explain differentiation in the context of treaty revisions. 
This paper seeks to advance the state of the art in two ways. First, it moves beyond the division in the 
literature focusing either on differentiation within the EU or differentiation in the EU’s relations with non-
members by providing an analysis of differentiated membership cross-cutting the formal organizational 
borders of the EU. I contend that the same factors and mechanisms explain differentiated membership 
among members and nonmembers. Second, the paper moves beyond typological description by putting 
forward and systematically testing a theory-based explanation of differentiated membership. 
In a nutshell, I argue that graded membership is an – often unintended – outcome of international dis-
agreement about proposals to deepen or widen European integration. Two types of disagreement can be 
distinguished: whereas some states refuse (further) integration, others are refused by the core of the EU. 
Where states are located in the EU’s system of graded membership depends on the point at which they re-
fuse to integrate further or at which they are blocked from further integration. New grades of membership 
are introduced if states refuse further integration in the current structure of membership but agree that 
further differentiation is preferable to the status quo.
I start from the assumption that states seek to improve, and to avoid losses in, governance quality and 
capacity when making decisions about regional integration. The “refusers” and the “refused” constitute 
two distinct groups of countries that relate differently to the standard of governance in the European 
integration set, represented by the core EU member states. In the EU, this standard has two major dimen-
sions: liberal democracy and governance capacity. Whereas the refusers outperform the core’s standard of 
good governance, the refused countries fall short of it. Both overfulfillment and underfulfillment produce 
governance concerns. States that outperform the core are concerned that integration will harm domestic 
governance capacity and weaken national democracy. The better these countries are governed, the earlier 
in the process they refuse to integrate further and the lower their membership status remains. Similarly, 
core countries fear that the integration of underperforming countries will dilute the EU’s governance 
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standard and produce problems of policy-making and policy implementation. The more that the refused 
states consolidate democratically and improve their governance capacity, the further they are permitted 
to move towards full membership. As a consequence, countries may have the same membership grade for 
opposite reasons. They may be better governed than the core countries (and refuse to integrate further), 
or they may be less well-governed than the core (and be refused to integrate further).
In the next section, I develop this theoretical argument in more detail. I then describe how the EU’s system 
of graded membership has developed over time. Subsequently, I present a panel analysis, which tests 
the effect of good governance on the graded EU membership of European countries since the mid-1990s, 
controlling for alternative explanations.
2. Theorizing Graded Membership
Why and how do international organizations establish differentiated systems of membership and why do 
countries find themselves in different grades of membership? I start with a simple model of differentiation. 
On the basis of this model, I hypothesize under which conditions the membership structure changes and 
which factors determine the position and movement of a country in this structure.
2.1 A Model of Differentiation
I assume that differentiated membership emerges from a sequence of decisions on the deepening and 
widening of an organization (see Figure 1). It is an emergent phenomenon in the sense that differentiation 
is often not the outcome intended by the actor proposing to integrate policies or countries further – and 
not even part of the set of outcomes on which the actors initially negotiate. Rather, it comes up as an op-
tion during the negotiations or after their failure. The major deepening and widening decisions of the EU 
come in the form of new treaties or the revision of existing treaties; they therefore require unanimous in-
tergovernmental agreement and domestic ratification. Deepening needs the consent of all member states; 
widening requires the agreement of both - the existing member states and the prospective new member.
Let us start with a typical binary organization, which has two membership grades (n=2): members and non-
members. A state or a group of states makes a proposal to deepen its competences or to widen its mem-
bership. If all states have compatible preferences, there is no demand for differentiation and the outcome 
is uniform further deepening – or full membership in the case of widening. If the proposal is controversial, 
however, veto threats arise. States may refuse or be refused (further) integration. When a proposal for 
deepening is made, a member state may refuse to participate in the deepened organization – or it may be 
precluded from doing so by the other member states. Likewise, nonmember states may decline member-
ship in, or be declined membership by, the organization. If differentiated integration is not an option, the 
outcome is the status quo: no deepening or widening. 
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Figure 1: A Model of Differentiation
Source: Author.
Differentiated integration provides an alternative to the stark choice between the status quo on the one 
hand, and full membership or uniform integration on the other. In the case of deepening, it allows member 
states desiring more integration to move ahead while those opposed to or unfit for further integration can 
remain behind for the time being. In the case of widening, states that do not wish to become full members 
can ask for a lower grade of membership that allows for some participation in the integrated policies short 
of full integration. Conversely, member states opposed to widening can offer the nonmember some form 
of association below full membership. 
If the supporters or opponents of deepening or widening prefer the status quo to differentiated mem-
bership, the status quo is reaffirmed and no differentiation is established. They may be concerned, for 
instance, about free-riding, discrimination, or high transaction costs from creating an additional grade of 
membership (Kölliker 2001). By contrast, if the supporters of integration find that differentiated integration 
will provide them higher utility than the status quo, and if the opponents are at least indifferent, they agree 
on creating a new membership grade. 
In the following round of integration, the actors play the same widening and deepening game again – ex-
cept that they have one more outcome option: differentiated membership. This additional option should 
make it easier to accommodate heterogeneous integration preferences and reach agreement on inte-
gration. Otherwise, the actors create another grade of membership if they prefer differentiation to the 
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status quo. The system will be increasingly differentiated until it provides for levels of membership that 
can accommodate any constellation of integration preferences that may arise when a new proposal for 
deepening or widening is made. I therefore assume that a new grade of membership is established if states 
(i) do not agree on the placement of a state in the existing system of graded membership and (ii) prefer the 
creation of a new grade to the status quo.
2.2 Explaining State Positions in a System of Graded Membership
How do states arrive at their positions in a system of graded membership? Again, the starting point for 
negotiations on (graded) membership is a proposal to widen or deepen the organization. Widening starts 
with a state that does not have any institutionalized relationship with the EU. This state makes a request to 
the organization to upgrade its membership status, or it may be invited to join. If the organization rejects 
the request, or the state rejects the invitation, the upgrade fails. If both agree, the state moves to a higher 
level of membership, and this process is repeated until the state joins the core, or until the organization or 
the state rejects further integration. Deepening concerns only the formal member states of the organiza-
tion. When a proposal is made to deepen the organization, each member state decides whether it wants 
to go along or opt out – and the states proposing the deepening decide whether they want other members 
in or out.
To explain why states move up levels of membership and why they reject or are rejected further integration 
at some point, I start from the assumption that organizations have a standard of good governance. Good 
governance standards prescribe how the policies of an organization ought to be made and implemented. 
In the EU as a multi-level organization, good governance standards refer to both the European level and 
the member states. These standards can be inferred from the general provisions of the Treaty on European 
Union and the more specific membership and accession criteria of the EU. 
The key provision is the first sentence of Article 2: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities.” These principles of liberal democracy apply both to the Union 
and its member states. The Union not only “recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles set out” in its 
own Charter of Fundamental Rights (Art. 6.1), but also accepts the liberal-democratic rights catalogue of 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as “general 
principles of the Union’s law” (Art. 6.2). The Provisions on Democratic Principles further stipulate, among 
other things, that the “functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy” (Art. 10.1). 
As regards membership, the Treaty specifies that any “European state” respecting the values of liberal 
democracy “may apply” (Art. 49). States found to be in “serious and persistent breach” of these values may 
be deprived of certain rights of membership, including their voting rights (Art. 7.2 and 7.3).
Another set of EU good governance standards refers to the multi-level nature of the Union. Whereas the 
Treaty commits its member states to “creating an ever closer union” on which they “confer competences 
to attain objectives they have in common” (Art. 1), the member states shall in turn “take any appropriate 
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measure […] to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of 
the institutions of the Union” (Art. 4.3). In spite of being a comparatively centralized international organiza-
tion, the EU has weak administrative and fiscal capacity in relation to its member states and relies on them 
to implement the policies it makes. In its list of official accession criteria, also known as the “Copenhagen 
criteria”, the EU therefore not only requires states to respect the values and norms of liberal democracy 
but also to develop a “functioning market economy” and the “ability to take on the obligations of mem-
bership” by bringing their national legislation in line with EU rules and obtaining “the administrative and 
institutional capacity to effectively implement” them.4 In short, the EU’s standard of good governance com-
bines liberal democracy and governance capacity. By contrast, the EU’s standard does not comprise any 
economic (wealth or growth), cultural (religious), or geographic criteria (beyond being a “European state”).
I do not claim that European states participating in European integration necessarily seek to promote or 
attain good governance for its own sake. It is plausible to assume that they are primarily motivated by 
geopolitical or economic goals (Moravcsik 1998). They take into consideration, however, how the gover-
nance quality of other European states affects the attainment of these goals and how their own domestic 
governance quality is affected by European integration. 
The more a European state’s political regime and governance capacity are aligned with the standards of the 
EU, the higher its membership grade is likely to be. The full members at the core of the EU – its founding 
members, originally – define the EU’s standard of good governance. They set the benchmark of liberal 
democracy and governance capacity for the other states of the region. Other European states deviate from 
the standard in two directions causing them to either refuse or be refused full integration. 
The refusers are characterized by better governance: they outperform the core on governance capacity 
and democratic quality. Because such countries would strengthen the EU’s democratic standards and gov-
ernance capacity, the core would welcome them as full members. Yet they have both the reasons and the 
means to decline full membership. High-quality domestic governance makes elites and citizens skeptical of, 
and/or reduces their need for European integration. The larger the gap between domestic governance and 
core EU governance, the earlier in the process states refuse to integrate further. 
Governments and societies in countries with high-quality domestic governance have comparatively weak in-
centives to engage in European integration but reasons to fear that integration will reduce their democratic 
quality and governance capacity. Survey research shows that living in a good-governance country decreases 
trust in European institutions (Arnold et al. 2012; Muñoz et al. 2011). Support for integration is weaker in 
countries with lower levels of corruption and more generous welfare states (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).
Concerns about sovereignty and democracy are common to all refuser countries and cut across the left-
right divide of Euro-skeptic parties, which have otherwise different motivations for opposing (full) EU 
membership (Skinner 2013). This commonality is generally attributed to the “well-functioning democratic 
structures” (Skinner 2013: 135) and “successful political legacy” (Theiler 2004: 640) of these countries. 
4 See, e.g., the European Commission’s definition of the accession criteria, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlarge-
ment/policy/glossary/terms/accession-criteria_en.htm; last accessed 29 March 2016.
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Political Euro-skepticism was already dominant in the 1992 Danish referendum on Maastricht (Siune/
Svensson 1993) and is a key component of the 2016 Brexit campaign against the “permanent supremacy 
of EU law” and the “undemocratic, inflexible EU bureaucracy.”5  Swiss Euro-skepticism is strongly driven by 
the perceived threat of European integration to the political institutions and traditions of direct democracy, 
neutrality, and federalism, which constitute the core of Switzerland’s civic identity (Theiler 2004).
Moreover, regional integration entails that national institutions and administrations become intertwined 
and interdependent. Member states with low governance capacity may be slow and ineffective in imple-
menting common policies (Tallberg 2002: 613). Corruption and unequal implementation undermine the 
level playing field the EU seeks to create. Elites and citizens in countries with high governance capacity 
therefore have reason to fear that integration with lower-capacity countries will reduce domestic gover-
nance capacity and the competitiveness of national firms. These considerations lead to two hypotheses 
about which countries will become refusers and how integrated they will be.
H1a: Countries with better governance than the EU core are likely to refuse full integration.
H1b: The membership grade of refusing countries is likely to decrease as their governance improves. 
Conversely, the refused countries are characterized by worse governance: they fall short of the core’s stan-
dards of liberal democracy and governance capacity. These countries are interested in further integration 
for political and material reasons. They seek access to the EU market and to EU funding; they expect inte-
gration to strengthen their domestic governance capacity; and they strive for the regional international rec-
ognition that a higher EU membership grade brings with it (Schimmelfennig 2003: 52-55). Pro-democratic 
groups and actors also seek more integration in order to subject the state to the EU’s political conditionality 
(Vachudova 2005). 
The core fears, however, that the integration of worse-governance countries will dilute its standards of 
liberal democracy and weaken the Union’s policy-making capacity. EU citizens place more trust in dem-
ocratic and well-governed countries (Delhey 2007). The core has the institutional power to refuse these 
countries further integration, and it will do so the earlier, the less democratic they are and the lower their 
governance capacity is. In order to move towards the core, the refused countries need to democratize or 
improve their democratic quality, and they need to strengthen their governance capacity (Mattli/Plümper 
2002). This is the main objective of the EU’s conditionality policy towards non-members in general; in its 
current enlargement strategy, the EU prioritizes the rule of law in particular. The corresponding hypotheses 
about the refused countries read:
H2a: Countries with worse governance than the EU core are likely to be refused full integration.
H2b: The membership grade of refused countries is likely to increase as their governance improves.
5 See the website of the “Vote Leave” campaigne: http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/our_case; last accessed 29 
March 2016.
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These hypotheses imply that governance quality affects both the refusers and the refused but does so in 
opposite directions. As initially poorly governed countries become more democratic and acquire higher 
governance capacity, their position in the system of graded membership moves closer to the core. As 
well-governed countries become more democratic and better governed, however, their position moves 
outward from the core. As a result, countries can be located at the same level of membership for very 
different reasons – either because they are better-governed or worse-governed than the core countries. 
Finally, the hypotheses should also hold in the opposite direction: as governance deteriorates, refused 
countries should be relegated to a lower status, whereas refuser countries should seek more integration 
with the EU.
2.3 Alternative Explanations
As pointed out in the introduction, a great variety of alternative explanations have been advanced in the 
literature to account for (graded) membership in the EU. They emphasize wealth, cultural and political 
legacies, identity, and neutrality. These factors do not only point to alternative explanations; some also 
qualify as potential causes of both good governance and membership, thereby rendering the association 
between governance and membership spurious. These alternative explanations need to be controlled for 
in the analysis.
Wealth is arguably the most important alternative explanation to good governance for the position of 
countries in the EU system of graded membership. Although it is not part of the official membership cri-
teria of the EU, it features prominently in all public debates about EU membership. In Walter Mattli’s 
(1999) account of regional integration, the economic (rather than governance) performance gap is the 
main motivation for governments to participate. Poor countries can be assumed to seek integration in 
order to gain access to the EU market and EU subsidies, attract foreign investment, and improve their com-
petitiveness; at the same time, they encounter resistance because they would become net beneficiaries of 
the EU budget, exacerbate competition for EU subsidies, and increase migratory pressure on the wealthier 
member states (Plümper/Schneider 2007; Schimmelfennig/Winzen 2014). Accordingly, the lower a coun-
try’s wealth, the lower the grade of membership at which it will be refused further integration. Conversely, 
wealthy countries are reluctant to integrate for fear of regional redistribution. In addition, they can afford 
to refuse integration and preserve their national sovereignty and policy-making autonomy. Finally, wealth 
is known to facilitate and stabilize democracy (e.g. Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000) and domestic gov-
ernance capacity. 
Cultural and political legacies are another set of potential influences on both good governance and EU 
membership. First, Europe has traditionally been defined against some “Eastern other” (Neumann 1999) 
such as Orthodox Christianity, Islam, or Soviet communism. States with such cultural backgrounds are thus 
more likely to be refused (higher grades of) membership. Conversely, it has been observed that refuser 
countries often have a Protestant cultural background (Theiler 2004). This may be a negative reaction to 
the predominantly Catholic founding members of the EU or reflect the association of Protestantism with 
good governance (Licht et al. 2007). Geography is closely linked to culture as Protestant countries cluster in 
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North-West Europe, whereas Orthodox, Muslim, and former communist countries are located in the East. 
In addition, however, geographical proximity generally increases positive and negative interdependence as 
well as familiarity. For both reasons, the closer that a country is to the core, the more likely is the mutual 
interest of the country and the EU in closer integration. In addition, geographical proximity facilitates the 
diffusion of governance standards. 
National identity constitutes a further explanation of graded membership. Exclusive national identities 
reduce support for European integration (Carey 2002; Hooghe/Marks 2005) and increase the likelihood 
that member states opt out from EU treaty revisions (Schimmelfennig/Winzen 2014). States with highly 
exclusive national identities are thus more likely to refuse integration. In addition, they may be regarded 
skeptically by the core members and blocked from full integration. 
Other explanations of differentiated integration are situated at the policy level. Kölliker (2001, 2006) 
attributes the durability of differentiation to the collective goods properties of the policies in question: 
excludable goods with non-rival consumption create the strongest incentives for inclusive membership, 
whereas common pool resources create the strongest incentives for stable differentiation. By contrast, 
Schimmelfennig and Winzen (2014) associate long-lasting differentiation with the integration of core state 
powers. Some grades of membership such as the Eurozone or the Schengen area are, indeed, policy-spe-
cific. Policy-based explanations go some way in explaining that both (core state power) areas are more 
differentiated than, say, the internal market (a non-core state power). In line with Kölliker, the growth of 
the Eurozone and the Schengen area over time can be attributed to the network goods they provide. For 
several reasons, however, policy characteristics do not qualify as alternative explanations of graded mem-
bership. Membership is a country-level property, not a policy characteristic. Because policy characteristics 
do not vary across countries, they alone cannot explain why some countries are more integrated than 
others. Moreover, most membership grades are not policy-specific but combine several policy areas.
3. The Differentiation of Membership in European Integration
The descriptive historical analysis of graded membership in this section serves several purposes. First, and 
in line with the theoretical assumptions, I trace how disagreement about deepening and widening pro-
posals that could not be accommodated within the existing grades of membership has incrementally and 
unintendedly expanded the EU’s system of graded membership. In addition, I provide anecdotal evidence 
that governance standards played an important – if not exclusive – role in such disagreements. Second, I 
show that the EU’s system of graded membership has not only become increasingly differentiated over 
time but that this differentiation has remained durable in spite of overall progress toward more integration. 
Finally, I use the description to develop an inductive classification of membership grades, which will serve 
as the dependent variable in the subsequent panel analysis. 
Figure 2 illustrates the development of graded membership in European integration. The conventional 
starting point for the European integration process is the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. The ECSC started with and maintained a simple binary membership 
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structure. By contrast, the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958 
provided for the association of third countries (Art. 238) below the membership threshold. Association 
was the only category of graded membership for European countries explicitly codified in the Treaty of 
Rome.6 The first association agreement was signed between the EEC and Greece in 1961. This agreement 
did not result from a (rejected) proposal to enlarge the Community but reflected the common preferences 
of Greece and the member states to aim for a customs union for the time being and prepare for member-
ship later on (Pelt 2006: 179-214). Subsequent differentiations were, however, outcomes of disagreement 
about integration proposals. I present them in chronological order.
Figure 2: Development of Graded EU Membership (1952-2015)
Source: Author.
The first case was Spain. At the time of the association negotiations between the EEC and Greece, the 
Spanish government, too, expressed its interest in joining the Community and concluding an association 
agreement as a stepping-stone. Whereas the member state governments were initially favorable to the 
Spanish request, they eventually rejected it after strong mobilization by the Parliamentary Assembly and 
European trade unions against the association of a non-democratic state (Thomas 2006). As a consolation 
prize, Spain became the first European country to start negotiations on a preferential trade agreement 
with the EEC in 1967.
When accession negotiations with Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway were launched in 1970, the other 
member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) started negotiations on free trade agree-
ments with the EEC. The four most important economies of this group – Austria, Finland, Sweden, and 
Switzerland – were not only opposed to full membership but also to association with the EEC, mainly in 
6 Another set of provisions related to the association of overseas territories.
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order to uphold their neutral or non-aligned status in the Cold War. Yet they also sought to preserve the free 
trade regime they had established with Britain, Denmark, and Norway in EFTA (Gehler/Steininger 2000). 
For this reason, a preferential trade agreement was considered insufficient. As an in-between solution, the 
EEC invented Special Relations Agreements on industrial free trade with these four countries, Iceland, and 
Portugal (signed in 1972 and 1973). Norway joined after its voters had rejected accession in a referendum.
After the EEC had signed a first (non-preferential) trade agreement with Yugoslavia in 1970, both sides de-
cided to expand their cooperation beyond trade later in the decade. Yet the EU ruled out association or free 
trade because Yugoslavia was neither a democratic country nor a market economy. Instead, the European 
Community (EC) created a new type of agreement, a comprehensive Cooperation Agreement signed in 
1980 and covering a large number of policy areas including energy, transport, agriculture, fisheries, the 
environment, and tourism (Commission of the European Communities 1988). Exploratory talks for an as-
sociation agreement were held when Yugoslavia began to democratize in the late 1980s but aborted when 
civil war broke out. Following the Yugoslav precedent, cooperation agreements (now termed Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements) were widely used by the EU in its relations with post-Soviet countries on an 
uncertain path toward democratic and market economy transition after the end of the Cold War.
Differentiation among formal member states started in the mid-1980s. Only five out of 10 member states 
signed the Schengen Agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders in 1985. This 
limited number resulted from two types of refusals. The UK (and Ireland in its tow), Denmark and Greece 
rejected the idea of relinquishing control of their national borders; Italy supported the idea but was initially 
prevented from joining because it was not considered to control its external borders effectively (Gehring 
1998; Kölliker 2006: 212f). To be able to move ahead with their project nevertheless, the Schengen-5 con-
cluded an intergovernmental treaty outside the Community framework. The Schengen provisions and re-
lated policies (such as asylum policy) were reintegrated into the EU by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 but 
have remained differentiated to this day.
In the Single European Act of 1986, the EC prepared the ground for establishing a single market until 1993. 
Fearing economic loss from trade and investment diversion, the free trade partners of the EC strove to 
secure a place in the internal market. With the exception of Austria, they did not initially seek full mem-
bership, however. At the same time, the EC wanted to avoid admitting new members while it was busy 
implementing the internal market program.  In 1989, Commission President Jacques Delors therefore pro-
posed the creation of the European Economic Area (EEA), providing for market integration without formal 
EC membership. 
In 1990, the EC opened negotiations on Economic and Monetary Union. The British government opposed 
the single currency from the start of the negotiations; in Denmark, it was rejected in a referendum. As a 
consequence, the Treaty on European Union (1992) contained formal “opt-outs” from monetary union for 
these two countries. The divide between the Eurozone and the rest of the EU has since become the most 
important form of graded membership among EU member states. 
Further differentiation during the 1990s concerned the non-member countries. In Switzerland, the ref-
erendum on the EEA Treaty failed in December 1992. Because the country did not want to be excluded 
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from the internal market, however, it started negotiations on a series of bilateral international agreements 
– devoid of the EEA’s supranational institutional mechanisms – in 1994. Finally, the EU invented the formal 
status of candidate country in 1997, when it decided to open the accession process with ten Central and 
Eastern European applicants but to start actual negotiations only with those five that fulfilled the political 
accession criteria best (Schimmelfennig 2003: 100-105). Moreover, Turkey reacted harshly against being 
excluded from the accession process by blocking further talks with the EU and on Cyprus and by threaten-
ing to veto the use of NATO facilities for EU missions. By granting Turkey the status of candidate for mem-
bership in 1999, the EU made an accommodative gesture without committing itself to actual accession ne-
gotiations (Önis 2000: 470). Since then, the EU has used the candidate status to reward countries seeking 
membership for progress on good governance, while deferring the decision to open accession negotiations.
In sum, the EU has gradually differentiated its membership structure. Starting with the basic distinction 
of formal members and non-members, which is common to all international organizations, and a tran-
sitional status of accession negotiations, which can take many years in the EU case, it has created nine 
additional formal grades of membership since its foundation. With the exception of the Treaty of Rome’s 
“association” status, each new grade of membership has been a response to a contested deepening or 
widening proposal, which could not be accommodated on the basis of the existing membership structure. 
The description further provides some evidence that good governance standards played an important role 
in the EU’s decisions to create new membership grades. The establishment of the “trade,” “cooperation,” 
and “candidate” grades was clearly motivated by the EU’s assessment that Spain, Yugoslavia, some of the 
Central and Eastern European countries, and Turkey did not meet the EU’s governance criteria for higher 
grades of membership. By contrast, the UK and Danish opposition to Schengen and monetary union as well 
as Swiss bilateralism were motivated by popular attachment to national institutions and concerns about 
national sovereignty. This relationship will be tested more systematically below.
Table 1: Grades of Membership in the EU Regional System
Formal 
membership
12 Complete integration
11 Monetary union
10 Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ)
9 Economic union
Formal 
non-membership
8 Accession negotiations
7 Candidacy
6 Internal market (EEA)
5 Association
4 Bilateralism
3 Free Trade Area
2 Cooperation agreement
1 Trade agreement
0 No institutionalized relationship
Source: Author.
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The EU’s grades of membership are of a qualitative nature. Whereas the relationship of the EU with each 
non-member has its peculiarities, and even most member states have specific individual exemptions from 
Community law, the grades of membership result from decisions of the organization to invent new types of 
formal agreements. As the brief history of membership differentiation also shows, the grades of member-
ship represent a rank order. Each new grade of membership was consciously distinguished from existing 
higher and lower grades of membership. Table 1 shows this rank order as it currently stands – from “no 
institutionalized relationship” at the bottom to “complete integration” at the top.
Whereas the grades of membership for formal non-members follow from the description of the trajectory 
of differentiation above, those for formal member states reflect different combinations of membership 
and non-membership in the main areas of permanent internal differentiation: the Eurozone and the Area 
of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ) comprising Schengen and other justice and home affairs policies. 
All member states of the EU participate fully in the internal market and its flanking policies (such as com-
petition policy or consumer protection policy). This economic union is at the heart of the EU and can be 
considered the indispensable minimum of formal membership; participation in monetary union and AFSJ 
counts as complete integration; monetary union refers to membership in the Eurozone without full partic-
ipation in AFSJ; and the AFSJ status excludes monetary integration.
Even though the classification is inductive and reflects historical EU practice, it could largely be recon-
structed deductively as an ordinal scale of integration. Measures of integration commonly distinguish 
“level,” the extent of pooling and delegation, and “scope,” the range of integrated policy areas (Börzel 
2005; Hooghe/Marks 2015). The level and/or scope of integration generally increase with every step from 
the low to the high end of the scale. Cooperation agreements have a larger scope than trade agreements; 
FTAs deepen economic integration in comparison with cooperation agreements. Switzerland’s bilateralism 
moves beyond a free-trade area but eschews the supranational legal integration characteristic of the EEA 
and the commitment to membership typical of association. Candidacy includes a commitment to full mem-
bership that is absent for EEA countries. Finally, the level and scope of integration is higher in monetary 
union than in economic union, and for the members of both economic and monetary union, the scope of 
integration is broader if they participate in AFSJ additionally. 
Figure 2 illustrates not only that the EU has invented ever more grades of membership. It also shows that 
EU’s system of graded membership has institutionally consolidated over time. For the thirteen grades of 
membership listed in Table 1, Figure 2 shows how many grades of membership were in place (solid line) 
and how many were actually used (dotted line) in any given year.7 Established and used grades of member-
ship have generally increased together; in some periods (especially from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s), 
all existing grades of membership were in use, too. Currently, all countries of the region are part of the 
EU’s system of graded membership, and 11 out of 13 membership grades have been in use by at least one 
European state since 2010. Finally, Figure 2 shows that the system has been institutionally stable since 
1997. While countries continue to move across the grades of membership, the structure in which they 
move has remained constant. This is the longest period of institutional stability since the establishment of 
7 “Use” is defined as at least one country being in the membership grade or in formal negotiations with the EU on 
membership. For instance, negotiations on a free trade agreement count as the use of the FTA status.
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the EU, and points to an institutional consolidation of the system of graded membership after the dynamic 
development of the early 1990s.
Figure 3 shows how the countries of the region have been distributed across the grades of membership in 
each year between 1952 and 2015. Countries in the “complete integration” category are shown in black, 
completely non-integrated countries in white, and countries in accession negotiations in grey; formal 
members are shown in darker patterns, formal non-members in lighter patterns. A structural break of the 
system at the end of the Cold War is clearly visible. Not only did the number of countries increase sharply 
– but with very few exceptions (first Yugoslavia, then Kosovo) all countries of the region have been part of 
the EU’s system of graded membership. Both before and after the post-Cold War break, the integration of 
European countries into the EU system has gradually progressed – the darker parts of the bars have be-
come longer over time. From 1952 to 1969, the median European country had no special institutional rela-
tionship with the EU; in 1989, it was negotiating market integration. In 1991, the median European country 
was negotiating an association agreement with the EC; in 2014, it is an EU member state. Integration has 
been accompanied by differentiation, however. On the one hand, the share of European countries with 
some membership status has increased from 23 percent in 1952 to 100 percent in 2014, and the share of 
formal EU member states has reached 64 percent. On the other hand, the share of completely integrated 
countries has only increased from 23 to 39 percent of European countries since 1952. This persistence of 
graded membership is remarkable given the massive increase in levels of integration for the states of the 
region. These descriptive findings support the claim that graded membership is a core feature of European 
integration.
Figure 3: Distribution of European Countries across Grades of Membership (1952-2015)
Source: Author. 
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4. Good Governance and Graded Membership
The subsequent analysis examines the hypothesized relationships between good governance and country 
positions in the EU’s system of graded membership in the twenty-year period since the mid-1990s, while 
controlling as convincingly as possible for the effects of alternative explanations. This period is character-
ized by considerable structural continuity facilitating comparative analysis. The instability in the European 
regional system caused by the end of the Cold War had largely ended. Apart from the independence of 
Montenegro in 2006 and Kosovo in 2008, the number of European countries did not change.8 Moreover, 
the structure of graded EU membership has remained stable: no new grades were established. Finally, no 
country has switched from refused to refuser country or vice versa.9 On the downside, many European 
countries have not changed their position at all. This is true for the founding members, four additional core 
member states, and the refusing countries Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, and the UK. In addition, 
the results cannot be generalized to the early European integration period from the 1950s to the 1990s, 
when Cold War alignments and neutrality had a strong impact on membership. The unit of analysis in the 
regional panel is the country-year. 
The dependent variable is the position of a European country in the EU system of graded membership at 
the end of the year.10 A country’s position is coded based on its membership grade (according to Table 1) 
and the type of the membership decision (refusers vs. refused countries).11 In order to arrive at a one-di-
mensional, linear measurement of the dependent variable, membership grades for the refused countries 
are coded from 0-11; the fully integrated core has a position of 12; and membership grades for the refuser 
countries are coded from 13-24 as their level of integration decreases. This transformation allows me to 
analyze the non-linear effect of good governance on membership as linear. Low governance quality results 
in a low membership grade for the refused; as governance quality improves, countries are positioned 
increasingly close to the core; once it exceeds the governance standard of the core, however, countries are 
expected to refuse further integration and to be positioned further away from the core as their governance 
quality increases. Table 2 lists the distribution of membership grades and their coding for the panel at the 
end of 2015.
8 Europe is defined as including all countries that stand a theoretical chance to become EU members. This includes 
Turkey, the countries of the Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), and the Western former Soviet 
republics (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine) but not Russia, i.e. currently 44 European countries. The European 
micro-states are excluded, too.
9 A borderline case is Armenia’s decision, under Russian pressure, to end association negotiations with the EU in 
2013.
10 As in the descriptive analysis, membership in each grade begins with the formal start of negotiations on the rel-
evant agreement(s), the nomination as candidate country, and the accession to the Schengen and euro zones. 
The findings do not change substantially, if membership is taken to start with the signing of the agreements. See 
Appendix 3. 
11 Note that I code the initial decision. For instance, whereas the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland do not want 
to introduce the euro at this point, their non-membership in the euro zone originally resulted from a refusal of the 
old member states.
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Table 2: The EU System of Graded Membership in 2015 (with codes)
Hemisphere
Circle
Refusers Refused
Complete integration (Core) 12 Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain
Monetary union 13 Ireland 11 Cyprus
AFSJ 14 Sweden 10 Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland 
Economic union 15 Denmark, UK 9 Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania
Accession negotiations 16 --- 8 Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey
Candidacy 17 Iceland 7 Albania, Macedonia
Internal market (EEA) 18 Norway 6 ---
Association 19 --- 5 Bosnia-Hercegovina, Georgia, 
Moldova, Ukraine
Bilateralism 20 Switzerland 4 ---
Free Trade Area 21 --- 3 ---
Cooperation agreement 22 --- 2 Armenia, Azerbaijan
Trade agreement 23 --- 1 Belarus
No institutionalized relationship 24 --- 0 Kosovo
Source: Author.
The main explanatory variable “good governance” is measured as the annual mean score of the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI).12 The WGI are particularly suitable for the present analysis because they 
capture both main components of the EU standard of good governance: liberal democracy and governance 
capacity. The six indicators are “voice and accountability” and “rule of law” for liberal democracy and 
“political stability,” “government effectiveness,” “regulatory quality,” and “control of corruption” for gov-
ernance capacity. The WGI are aggregated from a variety of data sources including surveys, NGO reports, 
business information services, and public sector organizations, and are available for 1996-2014.13 WGI 
scores vary roughly between -2 and 2. Because the theory is based on the notion of a relative governance 
standard rather than absolute thresholds of good governance, the variable is measured as the distance 
of country WGI scores from the WGI mean of the core in a given year. The mean WGI score of the core 
countries has decreased from 1.41 in 1996 to 1.12 in 2014, indicating a deterioration of the EU standard of 
good governance.
12 See the website of the WGI project, available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home; 2 
June 2016.
13 See WGI Data Sources, available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc-sources; 2 June 
2016. Values for 1997 and 1999 were added by linear imputation.
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Figure 4: Worldwide Governance Indicators and Membership Grades
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Note: Scatterplot of European country panel 1996-2014, pooled country-years (r=.90). 
Source: Author.
Figure 4 plots the WGI scores of European countries against their membership grade and provides initial 
support for the hypothesized association. In addition, it shows a complete separation between the WGI 
scores for the refused and the refusing countries. All non-core European countries above the WGI mean 
of the core are refusers; those at or below the core mean are refused. This distribution indicates that good 
governance perfectly predicts whether countries refuse or are being refused (full) integration. By contrast, 
the distinction between core countries and non-core countries is less clearly shaped by good governance. 
It is also noteworthy that, whereas many refused countries are outside the core countries’ range of WGI 
scores, refusing countries generally fall within the range of core governance quality. 
I account for the alternative explanations by adding either control variables or fixed effects depending 
on whether they vary across time. Wealth is measured as the natural logarithm of expenditure-side real 
GDP per capita at chained purchasing-power parities in order to compare relative living standards across 
countries and over time (Feenstra et al. 2013). Because this measure is only available until 2011 (and not 
for Kosovo), including ”wealth” reduces the number of observations. Cultural and political legacies as well 
as geography are time-invariant.14 Because I am not substantively interested in their effects but need to 
14 The map depicted in Appendix 1 provides strong visual evidence for geographical and cultural patterns in graded 
membership. Whereas refuser countries are predominantly located in the northwest of Europe, refused countries 
are predominantly located in the east.
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make sure they do not bias my estimates of the good governance effect, I control for them by including 
fixed effects. As national identities tend to be relatively stable (and pan-European data is not available)15, I 
assume that their effects can be reasonably treated as fixed, too. The fixed-effects design also takes care of 
all other unobserved heterogeneity between countries. Finally, I include year dummies in the fixed-effects 
analysis because the association between governance and membership is likely affected by temporal het-
erogeneity and events such as the war in Kosovo 1999 or the EU crises.    
I use a variety of linear regression models for the analysis (see Table 3). Even though the membership 
grades represent an ordinal scale, the number of categories is relatively large (25) and Figure 2 suggests 
a good enough fit of the data with a linear model. In order to avoid simultaneity bias, the independent 
variables are lagged by one year.
Model 1 corroborates the descriptive analysis in a bivariate pooled OLS regression analysis. Model 2 in-
troduces wealth, the main control variable. As expected, wealth is positively associated with membership, 
reduces the size of the coefficient for the WGI scores, and improves the model fit – but the association be-
tween good governance and membership remains intact.16 Whereas the pooled OLS estimation of Models 
1 and 2 makes use of the entire panel dataset to compare across both time and countries and provides 
a systematic description of the association between good governance and membership grades, it does 
not take into account the cultural and geographical heterogeneity described in most of the alternative 
explanations.
Table 3: Regression Results
1 2 3
Good governance 
(WGI distance to core mean)
4.80 (.33)*** 3.47 (.63)*** 2.73 (.38)***
Wealth (logged GDP p.c.) 1.59 (.64)* .32 (.43)
Year fixed effects Yes
Country fixed effects Yes
Constant 12.34 (.42)*** -3.86 (6.44) 6.30 (4.62)
N 813 677 677
R2 .81 .83 .92
Estimation OLS OLS OLS
Standard errors Country-clustered Country-clustered Panel-corrected
Note: Independent variables are lagged by one year. ***p <0.001; **=p < 0.01; *=p < 0.05. 
Source: Author.
15 The Eurobarometer data conventionally used for studying the effects of national identity are only available for EU 
member states.
16 Because the coefficients for good governance and wealth are highly correlated, there is reason to be concerned 
about multicollinearity. The VIF is still at a moderate level of 5.9, however. At any rate, including wealth in the 
model provides for a conservative estimate of the governance effect.
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Model 3 adds the country and year fixed effects. In order to correct for panel heteroscedasticity and serially 
correlated errors, it is estimated by Prais-Winsten regression with panel-corrected standard errors.17 The 
results confirm the effects of good governance on membership, whereas the wealth effect is again insig-
nificant. Figure 5 shows the corresponding predictive margins plot. After controlling for wealth, year and 
country fixed effects, a one-unit increase in the mean WGI score (relative to the core) causes countries to 
move up by almost three membership grades – the wider margins of confidence at the low end of the line 
indicate that this prediction works best for countries with intermediate WGI scores (roughly at distances 
of -1.9 and .6 from the core mean). As already indicated in Figure 4, the linear prediction works less well 
for the refusers. Indeed, it can only safely predict for countries with very high WGI scores that they will be 
refusers. In general, however, the comparison of expected and observed outcomes for the refusers shows 
few deviations.18
Figure 5: Effect of Good Governance on EU Membership Positions 
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Note: Predictive margins plot with 95% confidence intervals based on Model 3 (Table 3). 
Source: Author.
17 See Beck and Katz (1995); Plümper et al. (2005) on why AR1 error models are preferable to the inclusion of a lagged 
dependent variable. See Appendix 3 for results with lagged dependent variable and without year fixed effects.
18 Only two refusing countries have a predicted membership grade that deviates by more than one grade for three 
consecutive years from the actual grade: Iceland (from 2010 to 2012) – the model does not explain Iceland’s can-
didacy for membership – and Sweden (from 1997 to 1999). 
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In a set of robustness checks, I first substituted the WGI scores with alternative measures of good gover-
nance. The association of good governance and membership proves to be robust against variations in the 
measurement of good governance (Appendix 2). The WGI scores outperform all other measures, however. 
This seems to indicate that the combination of liberal democracy and governance capacity has a stronger 
effect than either of the two dimensions of good governance alone. In addition, the findings are robust 
against variations in the estimation method, the model specification, the measurement of the dependent 
variable, the relevant sample, or the lag structure (Appendix 3). 
5. Conclusions
Over the past decades, European integration has not only deepened and widened significantly but also be-
come ever more strongly and durably differentiated. The EU’s system of graded membership has become 
increasingly fine-grained and now encompasses the entire region of Europe. Yet it has not been systemati-
cally theorized, described, and explained so far. 
I have argued in this paper that graded membership is the – most often unintended – outcome of inter-
national disagreement on the deepening and widening of integration. By offering countries opposed to or 
deemed unfit for (more) supranational policy integration a customized position, it provides a solution to 
such disagreement. Whether a state refuses or is refused further integration, which position it takes in the 
system of graded membership, and under which conditions it moves towards the core depends system-
atically on its proximity to the standard of good governance (liberal democracy and governance capacity) 
established by the core members. The core denies further integration to countries that underfulfill the 
good governance standard. By contrast, societies and governments that outperform the core see little 
value in full supranational integration. 
The empirical analysis demonstrated that refusing and refused countries are characterized by clearly dis-
tinct governance quality. It also corroborated the main conjecture that the integration of refused countries 
increases with improvements in governance, whereas the integration of refusers decreases as their gov-
ernance performance improves. The position of European countries in the EU’s regional system of graded 
membership is thus systematically associated with their democratic quality and their governance capacity.
In focusing on good governance, the analysis was geared towards parsimony and generality. It has sought 
to identify explanatory factors that hold for all European countries, inside and outside the EU. Most alter-
native explanations were controlled for rather than tested explicitly. Future research could also look into 
additional factors applying to specific time periods and groups of countries. For instance, as indicated by 
Figures 2 and 3, other factors besides governance seem to have a role in the refusing countries. Yet the 
variety of controls and robustness checks applied in this study give some confidence that good governance 
will continue to stand out as a major factor of graded membership. 
Graded EU membership has become a core feature of European integration. Whereas the formal insti-
tutional structure of the stratification system has consolidated at the end of the 1990s, most grades of 
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membership continue to be occupied. Ongoing accession and association negotiations from the Western 
Balkans to the post-Soviet space, contested reactions to the many crises of European integration, and exit 
scenarios from Grexit to Brexit keep differentiated membership on the European agenda.
As in other studies of European integration, it is an open question to what extent the findings are relevant 
for other international organizations. Is the EU a laboratory of things to come in international politics more 
broadly, an extreme – but instructive – case for the comparative analysis of regional organizations, or one 
of a kind (sui generis)? Although there is no comprehensive or systematic data on graded membership in 
other international organizations, it is safe to say that formal differentiation is nowhere as marked as in the 
EU. At the same time, graded membership is a feature of many regional organizations. In Europe, NATO 
distinguishes between member states that participate and those that do not participate military integration 
(Iceland and, formerly, France), partners (with and without a Membership Action Plan), and observers. The 
Council of Europe has observers and special guests. Outside of Europe, Mercosur has associate members. Six 
of the 15 member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) formed the Western 
African Monetary Zone in 2000. ASEAN has observer and candidate states and experiments with “ASEAN 
minus X” and “ASEAN plus X” formulas in regional security policy (e.g. Simon 2010: 53-55). By contrast, other 
regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) or the African Union (AU) have not 
introduced graded membership. OAS Permanent Observers are from outside the region, and the African 
Union suspends the membership of countries that do not live up to its standards of good governance.
In principle, the drivers of graded membership in the EU should apply to regional organizations in general. 
Starting from the consensus of a small and relatively homogenous group of original member states, such 
organizations have incentives to differentiate if additional countries with more diverse preferences and 
capacities seek to join or if some of the original member states seek to expand the policy scope or level of 
centralization beyond the initial consensus. Correspondingly, a heterogeneous initial membership reduces 
the demand for graded membership. We may further assume that graded membership increases with the 
attractiveness of a regional organization and its centrality for regional international relations. Both features 
would explain why countries both strive for some form of membership and are content with less than 
full integration. In addition, graded membership is likely to increase with the level of authority and policy 
scope of the organization – both create incentives and opportunities for differentiation. These theoretical 
considerations suggest that the EU – a regional organization that started with a small and homogeneous 
membership, quickly turned into an attractive regional market, broadened its policy scope, and deepened 
its level of integration over time – is a most-likely case for membership differentiation. Only a comparative 
analysis of regional organizations would allow for a proper test of the conjectures, however.
Comparative analysis would also help to uncover the variety of governance standards that organizations 
establish to embrace or refuse new members – and that nonmembers use to decide how far they would 
like to become integrated. Whereas NATO and the Council of Europe share the EU’s liberal-democratic 
good governance standard, they probably put less emphasis on governance capacity. Many non-European 
regional organizations will follow other standards. Alternatively, graded membership may not be associ-
ated with standards of good governance at all but follow patterns of power or interdependence. At any rate, 
there is every reason to include differentiated integration in the comparative regionalism and comparative 
IO design agendas and the corresponding data collections.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Map of Graded EU Membership, 2015
Note: Core countries in black. Grayscales for membership grades according to Table 2. Refusing countries 
with line hatching; refused countries with point hatching. 
Source: I thank Jana Lipps for designing the map. 
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Appendix 2: Coefficient Plot with Alternative Measures of Good Governance 
WGI distance (baseline)
WGI (liberal democracy)
WGI (governance capacity)
Freedom Index
Polity
Transparency
0 1 2 3 4
Source: Author.
Appendix 2 compares the baseline WGI distance score used in the main text with mean WGI scores for lib-
eral democracy (voice and accountability; rule of law) only, mean WGI scores for governance capacity (po-
litical stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and corruption) only, the Freedom Index by 
Freedom House, Polity IV scores, and transparency (Hollyer et al. 2014). These measures also differ in the 
range of countries and years covered. All alternative scores were transformed to fit the range of the WGI 
scores. Wealth is only significant at conventional levels in one model (WGI scores for liberal democracy).
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Appendix 3: Coefficient Plot with Further Robustness Checks
Source: Author.
Appendix 3 compares the coefficient of the WGI distance across different model specifications and estima-
tions. The baseline Praise-Winsten regression is first compared with a fixed-effects estimation using Stata’s 
xtreg fe command, the inclusion of a lagged-dependent variable, and the omission of year fixed effects. A 
Fisher-type unit root test has been performed to assert the stationarity of the data. In addition, I performed 
a between-estimation (cross-sectional regression on the country means of the variables), which showed 
that the association between good governance and membership cannot be reduced to common trends 
(not shown here). As a further robustness check, I added country-specific linear trends to the baseline 
model. Finally, the results do not change considerably if the threshold for acquiring a new membership 
grade is set at the date of signing the relevant agreement rather than at the date of starting negotiations 
(disregarding negotiations). Nor does it affect the findings if core countries are dropped from the sample 
once they join the core (w/o core countries). This robustness check is based on the observation that no 
core country has ever become a refuser or refused country in the period of observation – except for a brief 
interlude of Greece outside the euro (refused) and for Sweden’s decision not adopt the euro (refuser). Core 
members appear to be very unlikely to change their position in the system. 
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